

DD1

7 February 1975

INFORMAL MEMO FOR DDI

Ed:

I confess that I had not seen the CIA paper on the meaning of the defense burden, but [REDACTED] has read it and makes the following comments in response to your query:

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"The points made in the DIA critique regarding the political dimension of the question of defense burden are, I believe, largely right. No doubt political considerations heavily influence, and even dominate, economic decisions, and defense has always had, and continues to have, a very high priority, if not quite an overriding one as the memo suggests. What is said in para 4.i. about how economic problems relate to detente is also essentially correct. If the CIA Memo implies that we think the Soviets have gone, or are about to go, soft on defense, then it leaves a wrong impression--one which was certainly not intended. But it would not be too difficult to deal with this objection by adding some language in the Key Judgments and in the text.

"This would not be likely, however, to give DIA satisfaction, since it is also objecting to the whole methodological approach. Whether this objection is well taken or not is for others to judge. But because of this objection, it seems to me that any effort to achieve a meeting of the minds on the issue as a whole--'to broaden the analysis,' as DIA puts it--is likely to fail. To invite DIA to participate in such an exercise will, at any rate, invite such an outcome, which I suspect is what DIA would prefer.

"I think the aim of your initial response should be to try to get DIA to give some indication of whether this is so. Therefore, I recommend that you ask Graham to express himself further as to feasibility of arriving at a 'paper intended to publicize our Government's views on Soviet military spending. . .' (his para 6) and on the question of a suitable methodology."

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